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IDAHO’S LLC ACT: ORAL OPERATING AGREEMENTS
AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
MARCUS H. WATERMAN*
Writing is nature's way of letting you know how sloppy your thinking is.
R. Guindon
ABSTRACT
Laws meant to increase certainty for contracting parties are only
effective if clearly communicated to the public. Where the statutory
landscape sends mixed messages, uncertainty often results. The Idaho
Code contains both a statute of frauds and an express authorization of
oral operating agreements. It is silent, however, on how those
provisions interrelate. The legislative comments provide little
clarification, alluding only inconclusively to a Delaware court decision
from 2009. The result is perplexing: told expressly by statute that
operating agreements may be oral, LLC members are left wholly
unprepared for a potentially devastating uppercut from the state’s
statute of frauds. To promote flexibility, certainty, and fundamental
fairness, Idaho should move to completely exempt LLC operating
agreements from the statute of frauds.
While critics have long doubted the general efficacy of statutes of
fraud, this article focuses specifically on the amplification of those
concerns in the LLC operating agreement context. Case law from both
the LLC and partnership contexts reveals the often-inequitable results
of applying statutes of fraud to otherwise highly flexible and familiar
entity forms. Rather than waiting for disputes to arise under Idaho’s
silent approach, we should act preemptively by adopting a new way
forward.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The limited liability company (LLC) entity form has become increasingly
popular in the last thirty years. Proprietors are attracted to the LLC form because
of the high degree of flexibility that it provides. Expanding that flexibility, many
states have recently moved to permit purely oral operating agreements. By failing
to exclude operating agreements from the statute of frauds, however, states like
Idaho put unsophisticated LLC members at risk of stumbling into a surprising
conundrum. Told in plain terms that operating agreements may be oral, members
are left wholly unprepared for the potentially devastating effects of the statute of
frauds invalidating central terms of their agreements. Idaho, which is currently
silent on the matter, should amend its LLC Act to exempt operating agreements
from the statute of frauds. Doing so would promote flexibility, certainty, and
fundamental fairness.
This article proceeds in several parts. In Part II, the stage is set with a review
of the modern trend to permit oral LLC operating agreements. Part III, divided into
several sections, explores important contextual matters: sections A and B consider
the purpose and scope of statutes of fraud in general, section C summarizes some
common criticisms of statutes of fraud, and section D explores the three provisions
of Idaho’s statute of frauds that are most relevant to LLC operating agreements.
Part IV is comprised of three sections, each identifying and evaluating a different
approach to the statute of frauds in the LLC context. Finally, Part V contains a
succinct recommendation for Idaho’s legislature moving forward.
II. THE MODERN TREND: PERMITTING ORAL LLC OPERATING AGREEMENTS
A growing number of United States jurisdictions have, in the last two decades,
moved to permit oral LLC operating agreements. 1 In doing so, state legislatures

1. See, e.g., Gregory Brockwell, The New Alabama LLC Act: Impact on Members’ Rights and
Internal Disputes, 35 ALA. ASS’N JUST. J. 66, 66–67 (2015) (permitting oral operating agreements in
Alabama as of 2014); John L. Grossman, New Laws Soon to Govern New Jersey Limited Liability
Companies, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Dec. 2012), https://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/new-laws-soonto-govern-new-jersey-limited-liability-companies/ (permitting oral operating agreements in New Jersey
as of 2012); John Cunningham, The Rules are Changing for Operating Agreements, N.H. BUS. REV. (Aug.
24, 2012), https://www.nhbr.com/the-rules-are-changing-for-operating-agreements/ (permitting oral
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have sought a proper balance between two key policy objectives: certainty and
flexibility.2 On one hand, the terms of an oral agreement are less certain than those
of a written one and are consequently more likely to “invite litigation.”3 This is
especially true where a third party joins an existing LLC and is deemed—as many
LLC acts establish—to have assented to all terms of the operating agreement. 4 This
kind of certainty can be called “certainty of terms” and weighs in favor of requiring
a writing. On the other hand, rejecting oral agreements decreases the flexibility of
parties to form and amend an agreement, especially in informal, familiar
arrangements.5 Further, selectively enforcing terms of an agreement depending
upon form tends to decrease the parties’ certainty as to enforceability of the
agreement, which can “frustrat[e] the parties’ intent.”6 This kind of certainty can be
called “certainty of parties” and weighs in favor of enforcing oral agreements.
The primary legislative intent behind permitting oral operating agreements
was aptly described by John Cunningham soon after he helped to draft New
Hampshire’s New LLC Act which permitted oral agreements.7 Primarily,
Cunningham described that the intent of the change was to avoid “trampl[ing] on
the expectations of LLC members unaware of the Old Act’s writing requirement.” 8
In practice, many of New Hampshire’s LLCs function informally, based on
“handshake agreements,” not written operating agreements.9 Thus, for the sake of
flexibility, the legislature forfeited the increased certainty inherent in written
agreements.

operating agreements in New Hampshire as of 2012); Washington’s Amended LLC Statute—Should You
Amend Your LLC Agreement?, PERKINS COIE (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/newsinsights/washington-s-amended-llc-statute-should-you-amend-your-llc.html
(permitting
oral
agreements in Washington as of 2016); Leanne Fuith, The New Minnesota LLC Act: Flexibility and Control
for Minnesota Business Owners, 9 WM. MITCHELL J. L. PRAC. 1, 6 (2016) (permitting oral operating
agreements in Minnesota as of 2015); Nicholas G. Karambelas, New D.C. Business Organizations Code:
Major Overhaul for Better Business Climate: Part Two, WASH. LAW. MAG. 30, 32 (Dec. 2011),
https://www.dcbar.org/getmedia/57b18cd3-7975-4706-8784d26a8e4e2ee1/WashingtonLawyerDecember2011.pdf (permitting oral operating agreements in the
District of Columbia as of 2012).
2. Larry Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 35, 45 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Peter Mahler, The Oral LLC Agreement: Boon or Bane?, FARREL FRITZ (February 3, 2014),
https://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2014/02/articles/delaware/laurel-hill/; see also Cunningham,
supra note 1.
8. Cunningham, supra note 1.
9. Cunningham, supra note 1.
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Today, the vast majority of states have concurred with Cunningham’s
conclusion and permit oral LLC operating agreements.10 The primary method of
doing so is defining “operating agreement” (or the state’s equivalent term) broadly,
to include oral and implied agreements. Under the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act, for example, “limited liability company agreement” is defined as “any
agreement . . . written, oral or implied.” 11 There are exceptions, however, including
New York which defines “operating agreement” as “any written agreement of the
members”12 and requires that members “shall adopt a written operating
agreement.”13 Altogether, only eight states require LLC operating agreements to be
in writing.14
In 2008, the State of Idaho became the first jurisdiction to adopt the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006). 15 Like Idaho’s existing 1994 LLC
statute, “RULLCA permit[ted] the members to adopt an operating agreement orally,
in writing, or through course of conduct.”16 Idaho is thus in the majority with
respect to oral LLC operating agreements.
Applying Idaho’s prior and current LLC laws, the Idaho Supreme Court has not
hesitated to enforce unwritten operating agreements.17 In Estate of Collins v. Geist,
for example, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an operating agreement existed
where the conduct of a father and son demonstrated their agreement that the son

10. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.06,
at 4 (2021); id. at 5–7 [hereinafter Appendix] (forty-two states define “operating agreement” to include
oral agreements).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18–101(9) (West 2020); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(18) (West
2009) (“‘Operating agreement’ means any agreement, written or oral, of the member or members.”);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-3a-102(16) (West 2014) (“’Operating agreement’ means the agreement, whether
or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, implied, in a record, or in any
combination thereof, of all the members of a limited liability company. . . .”).
12. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 34-102(u) (McKinney 2006).
13. Id. § 34-417; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0102(16) (West 2021) (“‘Operating agreement’
means an agreement in writing, if any, among all of the members as to the conduct of the business of a
limited liability company and its relationships with its members.”).
14. Appendix, supra note 10 (Alaska, Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
Vermont, and Wisconsin).
15. Rex Blackburn & Dale G. Higer, New LLC Act Preserves Idaho’s Traditions, ADVOCATE, Sep. 2009,
at 16, 16.
16. Id.; see also Nicole C. Trammel, Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Companies, ADVOCATE, Sep.
2009 at 20, 20 (“This new definition of ‘operating agreement’ is expansive - based on this definition, an
operating agreement could be written or oral, express or implied, and could even be formed
unintentionally. An LLC is bound by its operating agreement; and a person who becomes a member of
the LLC is deemed to assent to the operating agreement, whether or not she or he manifestly
assented.”).
17. Estate of Collins v. Geist, 153 P.3d 1167, 1170, 143 Idaho 821, 824 (2007).
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would conduct the business and affairs of the LLC. 18 Recently, in Johnson v. Crossett,
the court expressly recognized the validity of an oral LLC operating agreement.19
The Idaho Legislature’s and courts’ support for oral operating agreements
reveals an underlying policy judgment: flexibility outweighs certainty-of-terms in
the LLC operating agreement context. However, while flexibility is clearly
encouraged by Idaho’s willingness to enforce oral operating agreements, the Code
contains a serious limitation toward that end. Hidden behind a purported policy of
flexibility, and in contradiction to it, is an archaic and active statute of frauds.
III. ORAL OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
As Professor Daniel Kleinberg described in two recent American Bar
Association (ABA) articles, oral operating agreements create several concerns.20 To
address the concerns, he explained that lawyers should consider “three principal
bulwarks” of contract law: “statutes of frauds, ‘no oral modification’ provisions, and
the parol evidence rule.”21 The first, statutes of fraud, are independent creatures of
state law that apply regardless of the parties’ assertions.
A. Statutes of Fraud in General
Like many doctrines woven into modern American law, statutes of fraud trace
back to English common law. In 1677, Parliament passed the first Statute of Frauds
“[f]or prevention of many fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavored to
be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury.”22 In plain English—that is, plain
American English—the “statute was enacted to prevent fraud by requiring certain
enumerated contracts to be evidenced in writing.” 23 At the time, perjury was “a

18. Id. at 826; see also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited
Liability Company Acts – Issues Relating to Formation of Limited Liability Company and Addition or
Disassociation of Members Thereto, 43 A.L.R. 6th 611 (2009).
19. Johnson v. Crossett, 408 P.3d 1272, 1278, 163 Idaho 200, 206 (2018).
20. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Protecting the Sacred Writing: The Operating Agreement, A.B.A. (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2018/02/agreement/
[hereinafter Sacred Writing]; Daniel S. Kleinberger, Like Great Britain, a Limited Liability Company May
Have
an
Unwritten
Constitution,
A.B.A.:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(Sept.
28,
2017),
https://businesslawtoday.org/2017/09/like-great-britain-a-limited-liability-company-may-have-anunwritten-constitution/.
21. Sacred Writing, supra note 20.
22. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).
23. 9 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1 (4th ed. 2021) [hereinafter WILLISTON]; see
Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. 1982) (“The Statute of Frauds is the Legislature's directive that
courts enforce promises covered by the statute only if such promises are in writing.”); see also David G.
Epstein et al, Reliance on Oral Promises: Statute of Frauds and “Promissory Estoppel”, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV.
913, 929 (2010).

388

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 58

widespread and serious problem” and was Parliament’s primary concern when
drafting the 1677 Statute of Frauds.24
Today, most American states have adopted incarnations of that original
statute of frauds that are almost identical in operation and purpose. 25 While
prevention of fraud is still one objective of the statutes, however, many jurisdictions
focus more on the general benefit of ensuring reliable evidence. 26 Written
testimony is, after all, generally considered more reliable than oral testimony.
B. Scope of the Statute of Frauds
All states have adopted some form of statute of frauds.27 Since these statutes
originated as a common law doctrine, adopted over time into state law, their scope
varies widely across the country.28 Nonetheless, many states have adopted similar,
if not identical, components.29 Some of the most common terms covered, as set out
in Section 110 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, are (a) an executor’s
promise “to answer for a duty of his decedent (the executor-administrator
provision),” (b) any promise “to answer for the duty of another (the suretyship
provision),” (c) agreements upon “consideration of marriage (the marriage
provision),” (d) contracts for “sale of an interest in land (the land contract
provision),” and (e) promises that cannot be “performed within one year from the
making thereof (the one-year provision).”30
Idaho’s statute of frauds, codified in Idaho Code § 9-505, can be accurately
characterized as plain old vanilla.31 Aside from mere verbiage, it differs from the

24. WILLISTON, supra note 23.
25. James J. O’Connell, Jr., Boats Against the Current: The Courts and the Statute of Frauds, 47
EMORY L.J. 253, 267 (1998) (“Most American incarnations of the Statute of Frauds are essentially
unchanged from the original statute enacted by Parliament in 1677.”); see also WILLISTON, supra note 23
(“[T]he statute nonetheless remains the law virtually everywhere in the United States.”).
26. See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 23, at n.8 (citing Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84 (S.D.
2001) (“[T]he statute of frauds serves an evidentiary purpose, designed to prevent uncertainty by
providing written evidence of an enforceable obligation”)); id. at n.11 (citing Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657 (Alaska 2002)) (“The statute of frauds serves many
purposes. First, it provides certain, consistent, and predictable principles to guide negotiators. It
recognizes the inherent evidentiary worth of written evidence, and the potential injustice created by
relying on the memories of interested parties to provide the exact language of an agreement, which is
necessary to discern the limits of the promise.”); see also General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
27. Epstein et al, supra note 23 (“All states have statutes of fraud providing that certain kinds of
agreements are not legally enforceable unless set out in a signed writing.”).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.7 (AM. L. INST. 2000) (“[T]he Statutes of Frauds
adopted in the various American states differ in their wording and stated coverage.”); see Epstein et al,
supra note 23 (“Again, statutes of fraud vary from state to state.”).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“In many states other classes of
contracts are subject to a requirement of a writing.”).
30. Id.
31. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-505 (West 2021).
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Restatement’s list only in replacing the executor-administrator provision with what
I will call the “business-of-lending provision.”32 Like many other states, Idaho’s law
on commercial transactions adds its own components to the statute of frauds,
namely that “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable . . . unless there is some writing . . . .”33
C. Criticisms of the Statute of Frauds
Despite the widespread adoption of statutes of fraud in United States
jurisdictions, there are—and have always been—vocal critics.34 Even England, critics
note, repealed the Statute of Frauds in the twentieth century over concerns that
“assertion of the technical defense of the statute aids a person in breaking a
contract and effects immeasurable harm upon those who have meritorious
claims.”35 Such fairness concerns were thought to outweigh the diminishing value
of writing to bolster certainty-of-terms.36
Critiques of statutes of frauds are not a new phenomenon. Early in the
twentieth century, Columbia University professor Francis M. Burdick leveled a
wholescale denunciation in a Columbia Law Review article titled, A Statute for
Promoting Fraud.37 In his view—even a century ago—statutes of fraud were a “relic
of times when parties to a lawsuit were excluded as witnesses.” 38 Through
imposition of amorphous and counterintuitive writing requirements, statutes of
fraud frustrate the expectations of contracting parties. This, in turn, often leads to
inequitable outcomes. Instead of preventing fraud, Burdick asserted, the statute of
frauds creates a “highly artificial rule” that complicates what is simple, resulting in
decreased certainty of parties and thereby increasing the risk of fraud.39
Many critics of statutes of fraud argue that the original need for the law has
diminished due to changes in the legal system. For example, one reason for the
magnitude of the perjury problem in seventeenth century England was that “courts
did not allow parties to a lawsuit to testify.”40 Consequently, victory at trial often

32. Id. (“A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in an original
principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a person or entity engaged in the
business of lending money or extending credit.”).
33. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-201 (West 2021); but see Jennifer Camero, Zombieland: Seeking
Refuge From the Statute of Frauds in Contracts for the Sale of Services or Goods, 82 UMKC L. REV. 1, 3
(2013) (“Every state except Louisiana adopted Article 2 and, thus, applies the Statute of Frauds to
contracts for the sale of moveable goods.”).
34. O’Connell, supra note 25.
35. Azevedo v. Minister, 471 P.2d 661, 663–64 (Nev. 1970).
36. O’Connell, supra note 25, at 260; Azevedo, 471 P.2d at 663–64.
37. Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1916).
38. Id. at 273; see also Robert E. Ireton, Should We Abolish the Statute of Frauds, 72 U.S. L. REV.
195, 196 (1938).
39. Burdick, supra note 37, at 273–74.
40. Thompson Printing Mach. Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 1983); Burdick,
supra note 37, at 273.
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depended upon one’s ability to find a friend willing to testify in his favor. 41 Since
parties are no longer excluded as witnesses, critics argue, statutes of fraud are
unnecessary.42 Such changes in the legal system have prompted some scholars to
direct impressive lists of adjectives at modern incarnations of the statute of frauds,
such as: “ambiguous, archaic, arbitrary, uneven, unwieldy, unnecessary and
unjust.”43 Put succinctly by the Connecticut Supreme Court in a 1991 decision,
“[t]he statute has been found wanting because it serves none of its purported
functions very well.”44
Even at the time of enactment, some of the statute of frauds’ provisions
produced utterly nonsensical outcomes. The one-year provision, for instance, was
ostensibly enacted to address the unreliability of witnesses’ memories over more
than one year.45 Because application of the one-year provision does not turn on the
actual course of subsequent events, however, the provision produces perplexing
outcomes.46 For example, one unwritten agreement—capable of performance in
less than a year but actually taking ten years—is enforceable upon purely oral
testimony.47 Another unwritten agreement—requiring one year and one day to
perform and actually occurring in that time—is unenforceable upon purely oral
testimony.48 If evidentiary reliability is the end, the one-year provision appears to
be a seriously flawed means.
Ultimately, the efficacy of statutes of fraud in today’s world is doubtful.
Beyond failing to accomplish their purported goals, these statutes tend to frustrate
parties’ expectations and ironically, decrease certainty.
D. Where the Statute of Frauds Meets LLC Operating Agreements
Not all components of Idaho’s statute of frauds are relevant in the LLC context.
For example, it is undoubtedly a rare occasion (although possible) where an LLC’s
operating agreement includes a promise in consideration of marriage. Other
components, however, are likely to arise with some frequency and deserve
attention.
According to professors Bishop and Kleinberger, “[t]he three statutes most
likely to be relevant pertain respectively to the sale of an interest in real property,
the sale of goods, and contracts that cannot be performed within one year of their

41. See, e.g., Thompson Printing, 714 F.2d at 746.
42. Hugh E. Willis, The Statute of Frauds–A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430–31 (1928).
43. Ireton, supra note 38, at 196 (“[W]hatever reasons led to its passage in the seventeenth
century, the resistless and progressive march of time and events up to the present has swept from view
their last vestige.”).
44. RICHARD A. LORD,WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 24:1 (4th ed. 2020) (quoting C.R. Klewin, Inc. v.
Flagship Properties, Inc., 220 Conn. 569, 574 (1991)).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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making.”49 We will explore circumstances in which each of these could arise, or has
arisen, in the LLC context.
i. Land Sale Provision
Under Idaho Code § 9-505(4), “[a]n agreement for the leasing, for a longer
period than one (1) year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein .
. . is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing.” 50 It is not difficult to
imagine a scenario where Idaho’s land sale provision might invalidate a term of an
LLC operating agreement.
Imagine that Alice, Ben, and Carl decide to start a dairy farm and form as an
LLC. The primary startup costs are acquiring land and animals. Because Alice already
owns several acres of rural property, the three agree that Alice’s initial contribution
will be to lease her acreage, for three years and at a good price, to the LLC.
Meanwhile, Ben and Carl will each contribute $20,000 to purchase animals.
Because the three are well acquainted and lack business experience, they do not
reduce the agreement to writing. If Ben or Carl fails to provide their $20,000
contribution, Alice will have a valid cause of action to enforce the promise. If, on
the other hand, Alice decides after one year that she wants to use her land for
something else, neither Ben nor Carl will be able to enforce Alice’s promise. Under
Idaho Code § 9-505(4), Alice’s promise is an unenforceable oral promise to lease
real property for more than one year.51
Case law reveals that similar scenarios have occurred in the real world. In East
Piedmont 120 Associates v. Sheppard, a Georgia court invalidated an oral
partnership agreement because the promise to transfer real property was not in
writing.52 A landowner and entity had formed an oral partnership agreement with
the object of developing a shopping mall. 53 The landowner would contribute her
property and the entity its “expertise” and “services.”54 When the landowner
changed her mind, the entity brought suit for breach of contract.55 Under Georgia’s
statute of frauds, however, promises to transfer interests in property are not
enforceable unless in writing.56 The court consequently rejected the entity’s claim

49. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.06,
at 2 (2020).
50. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-505 (West 2021).
51. Id. § 9-505(4).
52. E. Piedmont 120 Assoc., Ltd. P’ship v. Sheppard, 434 S.E.2d 101, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30 (West 2021) (“To make the following obligations binding on the
promisor, the promise must be in writing and signed . . . [a]ny contract for sale of lands, or any interest
in, or concerning lands.”).
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because the landowner’s oral promise to transfer her property was
unenforceable.57
In Filippi v. Filippi, three children testified that their deceased father had orally
agreed to convey real property to a partnership.58 The partnership was composed
of the father and children and had the sole purpose of developing and selling the
land.59 While other terms of the partnership agreement were not subject to the
statute of frauds, the court held that the father’s oral promise to transfer the land
was unenforceable.60 Further, because the partnership agreement “mingled” the
land transfer provision with all other provisions, the court held that the entire
partnership agreement was unenforceable. 61
These examples clearly illustrate the relevance of the State’s land sale
provision to LLC formation. Where an LLC is formed for the purpose of developing,
acquiring, or dealing in real property, the land contract provision of Idaho’s statute
of frauds may strike important terms of the operating agreement. 62 Further, where
a member orally agrees to lease her real property to an LLC for a term greater than
one year, the statute of frauds may render that promise unenforceable. 63
Ultimately, the result is often invalidation of well-evidenced agreements,
frustrating the clear intention of the founding parties.
ii. Sale of Goods for More Than $500
Under Idaho Code § 28-2-201, “a contract for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more is not enforceable . . . unless there is some writing. . . .”64 Like with
transfers of interests in real property, LLCs formed in consideration of a member
providing goods to the LLC are subject to surprising invalidations. Case law is, again,
illustrative.
In Fillmore LLC v. Fillmore Machine & Tool Co., members of an LLC claimed
ownership of certain machines and equipment, pointing to another member’s oral
agreement to transfer those goods to the LLC.65 The parties stipulated the value of
the goods at $275,000, well over the statute of frauds’ $500 floor. 66 Applying
Indiana law, the court found that an oral promise to sell equipment to the LLC would

57. E. Piedmont, 434 S.E.2d at 102 (“Although partnership or joint venture agreements need not
be in writing as a general matter, see Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga.App. 39(2), 354 S.E.2d 666 (1987), the fact
that promises covered by the Statute of Frauds are made in the context of a partnership or joint venture
agreement does not render the statute inapplicable.”).
58. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 617 (R.I. 2003).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 618.
61. Id. at 619.
62. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 49, at 3 (promising to contribute land to the LLC would
be subject to the statute of frauds pertaining to land transfers).
63. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-505 (West 2021).
64. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-201 (West 2021).
65. Fillmore LLC v. Fillmore Mach. & Tool Co., 783 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
66. Id.
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be unenforceable under the statute of frauds.67 That is, although Indiana law
expressly permitted oral operating agreements, it simultaneously—in a separate
area of the code—struck any terms providing for the sale of goods over $500.68 In
Fillmore, that meant the LLC and its members had no recourse to seek enforcement
of an oral agreement to convey machines and equipment to the LLC. 69
Where, as is common, the founders of an LLC bring personal property into the
venture, terms of their agreement may be entirely unenforceable under Idaho’s
sale-of-goods writing requirement.
iii. One-Year Provision
Under Idaho Code § 9-505(1), an oral agreement is unenforceable if it is “[a]n
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof.”70 At least two kinds of operating agreement terms might be affected by
the one-year provision.
First, terms relating directly to an LLC’s duration are susceptible to
invalidation. Unless otherwise agreed by the members, in Idaho “[a] limited liability
company has perpetual duration.”71 This, like partnership laws default to
partnerships at-will, effectively means that members can continue the LLC as long
as they wish. Such an arrangement is not subject to the statute of frauds because it
could be performed within a year upon dissolution.72 However, where members
orally agree to a duration longer than one year, section 9-505(1) will invalidate the
term.73

67. Id. at 1178.
68. Id. at 1177–78; IND. CODE ANN. 23-18-1-16 (West 1993).
69. Fillmore LLC, 783 N.E.2d at 1178.
70. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-505 (West 2021).
71. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-108 (West 2021).
72. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 179 P.3d 1064, 1067–68, 145 Idaho 408, 411–12 (2008)
(“Idaho cases are in accord. A contract which is capable of being performed and might have been fully
performed and terminated within a year does not fall within the Statute.”); TERENCE W. THOMPSON ET AL.,
6 ARIZONA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 12:39 (2020) (“While one might contend that an operating agreement
lasts in perpetuity and cannot be performed within one year, precedent suggests that the one-year
provision should not apply, as it is conceivable that all members' lives could terminate within a year and
that the company thereby dissolves.”); see also Abbot v. Hurst, 643 So. 2d 589, 592 (Ala. 1994) (“[A]
contract establishing a partnership terminable at the will of any partner is generally held to be capable
of performance by its terms within one year of its making and, therefore, to be outside the Statute of
Frauds.”).
73. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶
5.04, n.440.4 (2020) (“[A] promise that by its terms requires performance that extends beyond one year
from the making of the contract would be subject to the one-year provision of the statute of frauds.”).
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Second, operational terms that require more than a year to perform are
susceptible to invalidation.74 One common agreement of this kind relates to
members’ terms of service with the LLC. For example, an oral promise by an LLC
member to perform some service or serve in some capacity for a term exceeding
one year would be subject to invalidation.
The most pertinent example of an operational term being invalidated under a
one-year provision is in Olson v. Halvorsen, a Delaware Supreme Court case decided
in 2009.75 There, the court invalidated an earn-out provision of an unsigned LLC
operating agreement.76 Though the term did not expressly refer to a date beyond
one year, the court determined that calculation of the earn-out amount required
more than a year.77 Therefore, because the term was never agreed to in writing, it
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.78
The one-year provision is the most likely to invalidate terms of LLC operating
agreements. Whereas the sale of goods or transfer of real property is generally
identifiable, it is not always easy to determine whether a term requires more than
one year to be performed. The less clear it is that a term is subject to the statute of
frauds, the more unreasonable it becomes to assume that unsophisticated parties
will be aware of the writing requirement. The result is often, as in Olson, unfair and
surprising.
IV. THREE APPROACHES TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN THE LLC CONTEXT
While many states have adopted some version of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (ULLCA), differences persist between the laws of each state. One
important difference concerns applicability of the statute of frauds to LLC operating
agreements. Though the issue has historically received little attention, the decision
in Olson precipitated movement among state legislatures, reflective of diverging
policy goals and priorities.
It is no surprise that the foundational case on statutes of fraud in the LLC
context originated in Delaware’s Chancery Court. 79 Making its way to the Delaware
Supreme Court, the 2009 case and subsequent legislative response set the
groundwork for the focus of this article. There, in Olson, the chancery court
considered Delaware’s LLC Act which “expressly allow[ed] oral operating
agreements, but d[id] not address whether the statute of frauds would apply to
such agreements.”80 The question of whether oral operating agreements were
exempt from the statute of frauds was a matter of first impression, both in

74. I use the expression “operating terms” to refer to those terms of an operating agreement that
establish the relationship between the LLC and its members, rather than terms speaking to the duration
of the LLC itself.
75. Olson v. Halvorsen, 986 A.2d 1150 (Del. 2009).
76. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 5:8,
at n. 4 (2020).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Olson v. Halvorsen, 982 A.2d 286 (Del. Ch. 2008).
80. Id. at 290.
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Delaware and elsewhere, leading to an analysis of legislative intent.81 In a few brief
lines, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the policy rationale behind the
statute of frauds was applicable in the LLC context, therefore the writing
requirements persist despite the LLC Act’s express acceptance of oral operating
agreements.82 Thus, the earn-out provision at issue, which could not be performed
within one year, was unenforceable.83 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed with an only slightly more comprehensive explanation.84 The court refused
to imply a repeal of the century-old statute of frauds where “the General Assembly
did not clearly intend the LLC Act to render the statute of frauds inapplicable.” 85 In
sum, the court held that “[i]f the General Assembly intends to limit the application
of the statute of frauds by removing LLC agreements from its scope, the General
Assembly must say so explicitly.”86 The following year, Delaware’s legislature
responded by doing exactly that.87
The important lasting impact of Olson is the presumption that when a state’s
LLC act is silent on the statute of frauds, operating agreements are subject to it.
Since the decision, many states (including Idaho) have cited Olson in their official
legislative comments to suggest the applicability of the statute of frauds.88 Other
states preferred the Delaware legislature’s approach, which doubts the efficacy of
statutes of fraud in the LLC context.89 Ultimately, in the wake of Olson, states have
taken three distinct approaches.

81. Id. at 287.
82. Id. at 291.
83. Id. at 293.
84. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1162; see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 49, at ¶¶ 14.02, 18.
85. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1162.
86. Id.
87. 2010 Del. Legis. Serv. Ch. 287 (H.B. No. 372) (West) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 6, § 18-101(9) (West 2020)); see also NICHOLAS G. KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LAW, PRACTICE
AND FORMS § 5:1 (2d ed. 2021) (“The Delaware legislature subsequently amended the LLC statute to state
that an operating agreement is not subject to the statute of frauds.”).
88. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-102 (West 2021) (“This article states no rule as to whether the statute
of frauds applies to operating agreements. Case law suggests that the answer is yes. Olson v. Halvorsen,
986 A.2d 1150, 1161 (Del. 2009)…”); KARAMBELAS, supra note 87, § 2:3 (“The RULLCA is silent on how or
whether the Statute of Frauds applies to operating agreements, so presumably the state versions of the
Statute of Frauds will apply to operating agreements as it does to any contract. In Delaware, the Statute
of Frauds applies to the provisions of an operating agreement.”).
89. See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-102 (West 2021).
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A. Complete Exemption Approach
At least five states expressly exempt LLC operating agreements from the
statute of frauds.90 Under this approach, oral operating agreements are wholly
enforceable, regardless of whether they contain terms that fall within the statute
of frauds.
The most apposite example is Delaware, where the amended LLC act exempts
operating agreements from “any statute of frauds.”91 The change came the year
immediately following the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Olson, and
apparently in direct response.92 This approach suggests that the LLC landscape
materially differs from other regions of contract law. After all, if a writing
requirement is not necessary for business formation, why should other contracts
be treated differently? This distinction has been met with varying degrees of
acceptance.
Doubting the soundness of the distinction, Professor Mohsen Manesh has
noted that exempting operating agreements, but not other contracts, departs from
Delaware’s historically contractarian approach.93 Manesh asserts that, whereas
Olson aligned the law with basic contract principles, the legislature’s subsequent
amendment—enacted “to the surprise of many”94 —“diverges from the rest of
contract law.”95 As Gary Rosin, Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law,
queried, “what makes LLC agreements more special than other contracts?” 96
The distinction is more sensible, however, when Delaware’s policy objectives
are considered. The Delaware Legislature adheres to the policy of giving “maximum
effect” to freedom of contract and the enforceability of LLC operating
agreements.97 In fact, this policy is arguably the “most attractive feature” of
Delaware LLC law, making the state “a mecca . . . for the organization of limited

90. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 76, §5:8; see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108 (West 2016) (“An
operating agreement is not subject to any statute of frauds….”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (West
2020) (“A limited liability company agreement is not subject to any statute of frauds….”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 605.0106 (West 2014) (“[A]n operating agreement is not subject to a statute of frauds.”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7663 (West 2019) (“An operating agreement is not subject to any statute of frauds….”); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:44 (2013) (“An operating agreement shall not be subject to any statute of
frauds.”).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (West 2020) (“A limited liability company agreement is not
subject to any statute of frauds….”).
92. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 49, at 29; Kleinberger, supra note 20.
93. Mohsen Manesh, Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth About LLCs, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 391, 413–
15 (2018).
94. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 49, at 49.
95. Manesh, supra note 93, at 415.
96. Gary S. Rosin, 2010 Amendments to Delaware LLC Act, UBE LAW BLOG (June 21, 2010, 3:45 PM),
https://uberlaw.net/2010/06/2010-amendments-to-delaware-llc-act/.
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West 2013); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286,
291 (Del. 1999).
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liability companies.”98 When viewed in this light, Delaware’s complete exemption
of operating agreements from the statute of frauds seems congruent with its
contractarian tendencies.
Florida has also adopted the complete exemption approach. 99 Commentary
on the move is illuminating. One Florida Bar article, authored by the chairman and
reporter of the legislative drafting committee, explains that the exemption
provision was “added to provide certainty for legal advisers and businesses.”100
Despite the clear benefits of written operating agreements, the Florida legislature
grants parties the prerogative to rely on purely oral agreements.101 Told that doing
so is acceptable, many members—whether due to convenience or unwariness—
will undoubtedly embrace the oral approach.102 Having chosen a policy of flexibility
and communicated that to LLC members, the Florida drafting committee properly
recognized that certainty requires consistently applying that principle. 103
Ultimately, according to states like Delaware and Florida, permitting oral
operating agreements while simultaneously invalidating them in certain
circumstances does not promote certainty and freedom of contract.
B. Partial Exemption Approach
Some states exempt LLC operating agreements only from specific components
of the statute of frauds.104 In other words, oral operating agreements may be
enforceable despite the statute of frauds, but only where the LLC act specifically
identifies the relevant statute of frauds provision and abrogates it in the LLC
context.
Illinois is a salient example. The LLC statute expressly states that “an operating
agreement need not be in writing even if it cannot be performed within a year.”105

98. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Douglas K. Moll, The Limited Effect of “Maximum Effect”, A.B.A. (Aug.
13, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/08/maximumeffect/ (quoting first Nicole M. Sciotto, Opt-in vs. Opt-Out: Settling the Debate over Default Fiduciary
Duties in Delaware LLCs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 531, 567 (2012); and then David G. Epstein & Jake Weiss, The
Fourth Circuit, “Suem” and Reverse Veil Piercing in Delaware, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2019)).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 605.0106 (West 2014) (“[A]n operating agreement is not subject to a statute
of frauds.”).
100. Louis T. M. Condi & Gregory M. Marks, Florida’s New Revised LLC Act, Part I, 87 FLA. B.J. 52,
54 (2013).
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 605.0106 (West 2014).
102. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 1.
103. See generally Condi & Marks, supra note 100.
104. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180 / 1–46 (West 2017) (“An operating agreement is
enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom
enforcement is sought, even if the agreement is not capable of performance within one year of its
making.”).
105. KARAMBELAS, supra note 87, § 5.1 (citing 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180 / 1–46 (West 2017)).
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Presumably, however, all other components of the state’s statute of frauds are still
in force.106
Like Delaware’s approach, the Illinois rule presumes that LLC operating
agreements are distinct from other contracts in some important way. Unlike in
Delaware, however, that distinction is only extended to one category of agreement
encompassed within Illinois’s statute of frauds.107 Despite the narrowed scope of
exemption, both approaches assume the underlying failure of statutes of frauds to
promote good policy outcomes in the LLC context.108
Illinois’s approach does not ignore the potential benefits of writing
requirements.109 In clear terms, the Illinois State Bar Association has affirmed that
“[t]he use of oral operating agreements presents obvious risks due to the difficulty
of proving (or even ascertaining) their precise terms.” 110 Despite those risks, the
legislature was bound to the reality of the circumstances; state law permits oral
operating agreements, and many LLCs take advantage of that flexibility. 111 If oral
operating agreements are going to be utilized anyway, the legislature concluded,
“there is little sense in their being subject to possible unenforceability due to other
law.”112 Allowing oral operating agreements generally but imposing certain
narrowly defined exceptions would tend to “substantially frustrate the reasonable
expectations of the parties.”113
Illinois’s 2017 move from the silent approach, discussed below, went almost
wholly without comment by academics across the country. Thus, there is almost no
scholarship to explain why Illinois exempted operating agreements from the oneyear provision but not other components of the statute of frauds. I see two
plausible rationales for the distinction. First, that the one-year provision has unique
potential to frustrate parties’ expectations, beyond that of other provisions of the
statute of frauds. And second, the one-year provision may be the only component
of Illinois’ statute of frauds perceived likely to apply to LLC operating agreements.
First, some legal analysis is often required, as in Olson, to identify terms that
are not to be performed within one year. In contrast, the sale of property is clearly
identifiable, even by unsophisticated parties. Therefore, while unsophisticated
members may expect a writing requirement for sales of property, they may not be

106. E.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80 / 1 (West 2017); Robin Heiss et al., Comments to The
Amendments to the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act Effective July 1, 2017, INST. ILL. BUS. L. (2017),
https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/cle/Full%20Program%20Materials%20%20Single%20Download_131.pdf (“Other portions of the general statute of frauds, however, such as
those dealing with contracts of suretyship or the sale of real estate, are unaffected by this section.”).
107. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80 / 1 (West 2017).
108. Heiss et al., supra note 106.
109. Heiss et al., supra note 106.
110. Heiss et al., supra note 106.
111. Heiss et al., supra note 106. ; see also BRUCE A. RICH ET AL., LLC OVERHAUL PROJECT: REPORTS ON
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO PORTIONS OF THE NEW YORK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY Law 6 (2019) (“the
practical reality that, all too often, LLC members do not adopt a written operating agreement.”).
112. Heiss et al., supra note 106.
113. RICH ET AL., supra note 111, at 5.
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a capable of identifying terms that fall under the one-year provision. This rationale
would explain Illinois’ partial exemption of only the one-year provision.
Second, the one-year provision is, undoubtedly, the most likely to arise in the
context of LLC operating agreements. After all, the case that originally prompted
discussion of the statute of frauds in the LLC context revolved around an operating
agreement that was invalidated under the one-year provision of Delaware’s statute
of frauds.114 Accordingly, the Illinois legislature may have thought it only necessary
to exempt operating agreements from the one-year provision.
Ultimately, the partial exemption approach rests on the same underlying
notions as the complete exemption approach but employs a more tailored solution.
C. Silent Approach
Third and finally, other states are completely silent as to the applicability of
the statute of frauds in the LLC context.115 Under this approach, whether terms of
an oral operating agreement are enforceable is left to the courts to decide.116
Most relevant is Idaho’s LLC Act, which is silent as to the state’s statute of
frauds.117 The Official Comments to the statute even include a conspicuous
emphasis of that silence, citing Olson to “suggest” what result silence will likely
produce.118
Several questions arise from Idaho’s silent approach. Most importantly, what
impact does Idaho’s silence have on application of the statute of frauds to oral
operating agreements? The answer depends upon the continued efficacy and
applicability of the Olson precedent in Idaho.119 The precedent will remain
efficacious so long as it is not overruled or otherwise repudiated in a court of
relevant authority. Having stood without challenge for over a decade, there is every
indication that Olson will remain untouched for the foreseeable future. The
applicability of Olson in Idaho, however, is more debatable. To predict what that
decision’s influence might be on an Idaho court, we must explore the Olson court’s
reasoning and consider whether it is sufficiently applicable in Idaho.
The Olson decision rested on the basic principle of statutory interpretation
that “[i]f two statutes conflict somewhat, [we] must, if possible, read them so as to
give effect to both, unless the text or legislative history of the later statute shows
that [the legislature] intended to repeal the earlier one and simply failed to do so

114. Olson v. Halvorsen, 982 A.2d 286, 287–88 (Del. Ch. 2008).
115. KARAMBELAS, supra note 87, § 2:3 (“The RULLCA is silent on how or whether the Statute of
Frauds applies to operating agreements, so presumably the state versions of the Statute of Frauds will
apply to operating agreements as it does to any contract.”).
116. See KARAMBELAS, supra note 87, § 2:3.
117. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25 (West 2021).
118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-102 (West 2021) (“This article states no rule as to whether the
statute of frauds applies to operating agreements. Case law suggests that the answer is yes. Olson v.
Halvorsen, 986 A.2d 1150, 1161 (Del. 2009).”).
119. Olson v. Halverson, 986 A.2d 1150, 1160 (Del. 2009) (citing State v. Fletcher, 974 A.2d 188,
194 (Del. 2009)).
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expressly.”120 Applying that principle, the court found that Delaware’s LLC Act and
statute of frauds could be construed together. 121 Why? Because the LLC act merely
permitted, but did not “guarantee enforcement of all,” unwritten operating
agreements.122 Next, the court looked to state legislative intent and history, finding
neither to suggest that operating agreements were meant to be impervious to the
statute of frauds.123 The legislature had every opportunity to expressly exclude
operating agreements from the statute of frauds, as it had done to other provisions
of Delaware’s Code.124 Without an explicit exclusion, the court refused to presume
legislative intent to do so.125
While not controlling in Idaho courts, Olson’s reasoning is squarely applicable
in the Idaho context. First, similar basic principles of statutory interpretation are at
play under Idaho law. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed, the Court
must “giv[e] effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will
be void, superfluous, or redundant.”126 The effect of this principle is similar to that
of Delaware’s that, where possible, provisions be “construed together.” 127 Parallel
to Delaware courts, the Idaho Supreme Court has also found that “[t]he intention
of the legislature to repeal must be ‘clear and manifest.’” 128 Second, the text of
Idaho’s act does not reveal an intent to make operating agreements impervious to
the statute of frauds.129 Thus, under Idaho’s principle that intent to repeal existing
provisions must be “clear and manifest,” there is no explicit or implied repeal of the
statute of frauds in the LLC Act. Third and finally, Idaho’s legislative history reveals,
if anything, intent to leave the statute of frauds intact and wholly applicable to LLC
operating agreements. Whereas in Olson Delaware’s legislative history was entirely
silent,130 Idaho’s legislature included a revealing Official Comment: “This article
states no rule as to whether the statute of frauds applies to operating agreements.
Case law suggests that the answer is yes.”131 If silence was sufficient to leave the
statute of frauds untouched in Olson, this legislative intent is certainly sufficient to
negate any implied repeal of the statute of frauds by Idaho’s legislature.
In sum, the reasoning from Olson applies squarely to Idaho’s context and it is
therefore very likely that Idaho courts will arrive at the same conclusion; the statute
of frauds does apply to oral LLC operating agreements. Other state courts have

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1161.
122. Id.
123. Id. (“[N]either the LLC Act's text, nor its legislative history supports that intent.”).
124. Id. at 1162.
125. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1162.
126. State v. Burke, 462 P.3d 599, 601, 166 Idaho 621, 623 (2020).
127. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1150.
128. Estate of Stahl v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 401 P.3d 136, 141, 162 Idaho 558, 563 (2017)
(quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct 182, 188 (1939)); see also Doe v. Durtschi,
716 P.2d 1238, 1250, 110 Idaho 466, 478 (1986) (“Only when new legislation is irreconcilable with and
repugnant to a pre-existing statute may we find an implied repeal.”).
129. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25 (West 2021).
130. Olson, 986 A.2d at 1161.
131. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-102 (West 2021).
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illustrated this in following Olson’s lead. For example, prior to Florida’s adoption of
the complete exemption approach, its LLC act was silent as to the statute of
frauds.132 Accordingly, in Araya v. Ward, “the Court f[ound] the holding of Olson
persuasive” and held that the statute of frauds did apply.133
Understanding what result Idaho’s silence will have, we move now to consider
the prudence of that approach. The rationale for applying the statute of frauds to
LLC operating agreements rests on one presupposition followed by two
suppositions. The presupposition is that statutes of fraud still serve a legitimate
purpose in general. Next, it is supposed that LLC operating agreements are
materially indistinguishable from other contracts. And finally, it is further supposed
that statutes of fraud should apply to LLC operating agreements just like any other
contract. Were the presupposition and first supposition correct, the second
supposition would indisputably follow. However, in recent years, the correctness of
those first components has become increasingly questionable.
First, as explored in detail above, there are serious doubts as to the continued
efficacy of statutes of fraud in general. The statutes not only fail to serve their
original purposes, but often lead to surprising and unjust results. The purpose of
this article is not, however, to advocate for the wholesale repeal of Idaho’s statute
of frauds. Doing so would require a much deeper review of the many applications
of each provision. Rather, the statute’s weaknesses are noted simply to show the
de minimis value that the writing requirements have in today’s LLC operating
agreement context.
Even assuming the presupposed efficacy of statutes of fraud, the supposition
that operating agreements do not materially differ from other contracts is itself
doubtful. First and foremost, the expectations of contracting parties are unique in
the LLC context. It is the legislature’s duty to adopt legal frameworks that comport
with the reasonable expectations of society. One important mechanism for
accomplishing this task is legislative consistency. By permitting purely oral
operating agreements, the Idaho legislature has laid the groundwork upon which
future LLC members will construct their reasonable expectations. Told by legal
scholars and advisors that LLCs are highly flexible, leaving governance almost
entirely to the members, the parties are led to anticipate significant freedom. And,
in fact, they generally enjoy such freedom. Terms relating to LLC profits, voting, and
interests, for example, may be established informally, with merely oral assent. The
expectations that this flexibility prompts, however, are flatly rejected where
members stumble upon any of the statute of frauds’ enumerations.
The threat of fraud is also less prevalent in the LLC context. Most LLCs are
comprised of members who engage in consistent communications with multiple
parties, have preexisting relationships with one another, and establish
demonstrable courses of conduct. Each serves to fill the evidentiary void that
statutes of fraud seek to protect against.

132. Araya v. Ward, No. 2012-CA-013906-O, 2014 WL 12595277, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2014).
133. Id. at *3.
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Ultimately, Idaho’s silent approach to the statute of frauds in the LLC context
fails to accomplish the dual goals of flexibility and predictability. Thus, it is time for
the Idaho State Legislature to consider a new way forward.
V. THE WAY FORWARD
That legal disputes have not yet arisen in Idaho is no reason to turn a blind
eye to the existing, faulty framework. Effective legislation requires anticipation of
future occurrences, especially where potential issues are evident in other
jurisdictions. We have seen oral agreements needlessly and unfairly invalidated
under land sale provisions identical to Idaho’s.134 We have seen promises to sell
goods abandoned with impunity while equally evidenced promises to contribute
finances were enforced.135 We have also seen operating agreement provisions
discarded for requiring more than one year to perform with complete disregard for
case-specific evidence of the agreement.136 It is only a matter of time before similar
disputes arise in Idaho courts, under Idaho law.
Both the complete and partial exemption approaches have one thing right:;
the statute of frauds does more harm than good when it comes to LLC operating
agreements. The silent approach, in contrast, continues under the fiction that
invalidating certain terms of oral operating agreements is necessary to ensure
evidentiary reliability.
Idaho should follow Delaware by completely exempting LLC operating
agreements from the statute of frauds. While the partial exemption approach
secures similar benefits in some cases, it leaves other terms vulnerable to
invalidation. By following the complete exemption approach, Idaho can ensure that
the reasonable expectations of contracting parties are upheld and can prevent the
use of writing requirements to escape clearly evidenced contractual obligations.

134. East Piedmont 120 Assoc., L.P. v. Sheppard, 434 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Filippi v.
Filippi, 818 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2003).
135. Fillmore LLC v. Fillmore Mach. & Tool Co., 783 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
136. Olson v. Halvorsen, 986 A.2d 1150 (Del. 2009).

